Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Natural Faculties', 'Mental Content' and 'Epistemological Disjunctivism'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19504 My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
19503 An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19505 Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19499 We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
19500 Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
19502 Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19498 Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19506 Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
19496 Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
19497 Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19495 Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
19501 We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19507 Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
21799 We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23796 Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
23793 On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
23792 Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
23795 Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
23806 Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
23804 Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
23802 Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
23797 Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
23799 Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
23800 Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
23798 Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]